Will Dilution of Iranian Uranium be in a US-Iran deal in 2026?

📡 Polymarket: 12%
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Event cutoff

Jan. 1, 2027, 4:59 a.m. UTC

Rules

This market resolves to “Yes” if a written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran that establishes a commitment for Iranian-controlled enriched uranium to be downblended or diluted has been mutually signed or otherwise formally adopted by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

A qualifying written instrument must provide for any quantity of enriched uranium held by Iran to be downblended or diluted to a lower enrichment level. The establishment of an enrichment cap or an enrichment moratorium, without a commitment to downblend or dilute already enriched uranium, will not qualify.

The instrument must require the dilution to occur within Iran, or for the diluted material to be returned to Iranian control, having been dilated or downblended elsewhere. Iran need not carry out the downblending or dilution itself; a commitment for a third-party entity (e.g., the IAEA) to perform it will qualify. A commitment to remove enriched uranium from Iranian territory does not qualify, unless the terms of the instrument specifically require the uranium to be diluted and the resulting diluted material be returned to Iran’s possession or control.

The dilution or downblending of Iranian enriched uranium must be expressed as a presently-agreed obligation to be implemented. A presently-agreed obligation to dilute Iranian uranium will qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the implementation schedule or exact dilution method, remain subject to future arrangements. A conditional commitment the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument (e.g., a commitment to negotiate a dilution requirement in a future agreement) will not qualify. A commitment explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation, will not qualify.

Unless the written instrument is formally adopted wi